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"Trade and": Recent Developments in
Trade Policy and Scholarship-And
Their Surprising Political Implications
Jeffrey L. Dunoff*

Lately, I've been thinking about the richly suggestive phrase
"trade and." What does it mean? Is it shorthand for new topics on
the expanded trade agenda, such as "trade and environment" or
"trade and intellectual property"? Does it describe new movements
in legal scholarship on trade issues? How is it similar to, or different
from, "law and"?
Until fairly recently, most scholarship about international trade
law fell within a relatively well-defined domain. The substantive focus
of this traditional scholarship' typically has been on a series of traditional, core "trade" issues: tariffs, quotas, most-favored-nation treatment, nondiscrimination, permissible safeguards and adjustment
actions, and the like.2 Most of the traditional scholarship shares a
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. This article is a revised
version of a presentation at the Conference on Institutions for International Economic Integration sponsored by the American Society of International Law's International Economic Law
Interest Group in May, 1996. Scott Burris, Theresa Glennon, Rick Greenstein and Laura Little
provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to Jane Baron, who
graciously reviewed multiple drafts with good humor and numerous insights. Kyle Danish provided invaluable help in preparing this article for publication, and Roy Barber provided helpful
research assistance. Finally, I am indebted to Joel Trachtman for inviting me to participate in
this conference. Work on this article was supported by a summer grant from the Temple University School of Law.
1 Throughout this paper, I will generalize about "traditional," "critical" and "interdisciplinary" trade scholarship. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that the scholarship within any of
these "schools" is monolithic, or that I have described every aspect of each of the "schools." For
present purposes, I seek only to portray accurately a range of commitments or positions that can
fairly be ascribed to each of these three "schools."
2 The seminal texts include JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT
(1969) and JOH.N H. JACKSON, Tim WORLD TRADNG SYs'rm: LAW AND PoLicY OF INTERNA-
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common set of assumptions rooted in classic liberal economics: that
liberalized international trade permits nations and firms to exploit
comparative advantages, that voluntary exchanges through trade are
mutually beneficial, and that liberalized trade enhances global welfare. Traditional scholarship also assumes, either explicitly or implicitly, the autonomy of international markets. This scholarship typically
urges the reduction-or elimination-of government "interference,"
either domestically or internationally, with "normal" commercial activity. While much trade scholarship still addresses these issues, today
this form of scholarship no longer dominates the field. Indeed, trade
scholars today are by necessity "trade and" scholars. That is, those
who write about trade policy can hardly escape study of relationships
among trade and numerous topics traditionally considered outside the
trade realm, whether they be regulatory heterogeneity, environmental
regulation, labor standards or competition law. These and other
"trade and" topics are among the most interesting-and difficult-issues on the trade agenda.
For this reason, I want to identify three different ways that we
might understand the phrase "trade and." First, this term might refer
to new issues on the trade agenda, like "trade and intellectual property," or "trade and environment." By addressing "behind-the-border" trade barriers, this new agenda is often hailed by traditional
scholars as an opportunity to further discipline the ability of governments to interfere with global trade. But, in the "trade and" universe,
things are not always as they appear. By focusing on the institutional
competence of trade bodies-and the political understandings supporting the trade regime-I want to sound a cautionary note. While
the conventional wisdom among traditional scholars celebrates the
trade regime's expansion into new substantive areas, I will argue that
this expansion may threaten the continued political viability of the
trade regime.
Second, the term "trade and" might refer not directly to the new
"trade and" issues themselves but rather to legal scholarship addressing the "trade and" issues. Much of this "trade and" scholarshipincluding most prominently much of the "trade and environment" and
"trade and labor" literature-purports to be critical of the trade regime. In response, many traditional trade scholars have resisted the
(1989). For a provocative analysis of Professor Jackson's role in
creating the academic field of international economic law, see David Kennedy, The International

TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Style in PostwarLaw and Policy:John Jackson and the Field of InternationalEconomic Law, 10

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 671 (1995).
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arguments advanced in the "critical" scholarship, arguing that they
provide justifications for increased government intervention in the
marketplace. From the traditionalists' perspective, the "critical"
scholarship thus appears to conflict with the aims of liberalized trade
regimes, such as the WTO or NAFTA. But, again, things are not always what they seem. I will argue that the "critical" writings are less
an attack on liberalized trade than a reaffirmation of core trade and
market premises. Thus, while the "critical" scholarship may appear to
challenge traditionalist assumptions and hence critique the status quo,
it is actually rather conservative in its assumptions and reform
proposals.
Third, the phrase "trade and" might identify a narrower body of
writings on the new trade issues, those that use interdisciplinary approaches. The analogy here is to the various domestic "law and"
movements, like law and economics, or law and society. In this sense
"interdisciplinary trade and" scholarship might be an umbrella term
encompassing the trade and economic analysis that Joel Trachtman
often uses,3 the trade and public choice analysis that Alan Sykes often
employs 4 or the eclectic mix of postmodern and other insights found
in Jeffery Atik's work.5 As the papers in this Symposium illustrate,
much of the "interdisciplinary" scholarship adopts economic assumptions and methodology. It is often written by scholars with deep roots
in the trade community and is typically considered supportive of liberalized trade. Once again, however, things may not be as they appear.
I will try to demonstrate that at least some of this interdisciplinary
scholarship may warrant increased, rather than decreased, government intervention in markets. Thus, my third claim is that interdisciplinary trade and scholarship often looks rather conservative, but may
actually be quite radical in its implications.

3 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the InternationalEconomic Organization:Toward ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 470
(1997) (applying insights of new institutional economics and industrial organization to international economic organizations); Joel P. Trachman, Trade and... Problems, Cost-BenefitAnalysis
and Subsidiary (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (applying comparative institutional
cost-benefit analysis in "trade and" context).
4 See Alan 0. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in the International
System (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes,
Toward a Positive Theory of the Most FavoredNation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/
GATT System, 16 INT'L REv. OF L. & ECON. 27 (1996).
5 See Jeffery Atik, Scientific Determinations with WTO and NAFTA Dispute Resolution as
Forms of Regional Legislation, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 736 (1997).
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SHOULD TRADIONALISTS CELEBRATE THE TRADE REGIME'S
EXPANsION INTO NEw SUBSTANTIVE AREAS?

There can be little doubt that "trade and" issues now dominate
trade policy, as the agenda of the upcoming WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference illustrates. The first Ministerial level meeting since
the WTO's formation will largely focus on trade and intellectual prop-

erty, trade and investment, trade and environment, trade and competition and, perhaps, trade and labor standards. 6 In addition, the U.S.
seeks to add trade and corruption to the agenda.7
Why this expansion into all of these "trade and" areas? Why
have these issues come to the fore now? The conventional answer
starts by noting the GATT's success at addressing tariffs and other
traditional trade barriers. 8 As the significance of these "border barriers" has decreased, there has been an increase in the relative signifi-

cance of behind the border barriers-such as differences in
competition or intellectual property law.9 And this regulatory heterogeneity'°--in combination with greatly increased trade-gives rise to
the "trade and" agenda. These topics have achieved prominence now
because, while not all of them are novel,1 "what is new is the extent
and intensity of international transactions and their capacity to influ-

6 See, e.g., Efforts to Hammer Out Agenda for December WTO Meeting in Singapore,BNA
INT'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 17, 1996 (WTO Director General urges progress on environment,

labor, competition and investment issues in Singapore).
7 These, and similar issues are likewise central to discussions and negotiations at other multilateral trade fora. See e.g., Link Between Labor Rights, Trade Gaining Acceptance, DOL's
Otero Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Aug. 6, 1996 (identifying various fora where "trade and
labor" issues raised); U.S. Official Says Trade and Labor MinistersShould Discuss FTAA Project,
BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, May 10, 1996; FTAA DeclarationPuts Off Issue of Trade and Environment Ti11997, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 25, 1996.
8 Thus, even before the Uruguay Round agreements, leading scholars declared that "tariffs
today are so low as no longer to constitute a significant barrier to international trade." John
Gerard Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited. Institutions and Progress in InternationalEconomic Relations, in PROGRESS INPOSTWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 201,217 (Emanuel Ad-

ler & Beverly Crawford eds., 1991) [hereinafter Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited].
9 See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: InternationalLiberalization and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy, 24 J. INT'L STUDIES 507, 509 (1994).
10 I borrow this phrase from Alan 0. Sykes. See Sykes, supra note 4.
11 The link between labor and trade issues has long been considered in the ILO context. See
e.g., Steve Charnovitz, FairLabor Standardsand InternationalTrade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE 61, 63
(1986). The implications of cartels on international trade was an issue in the 1920s, and the draft
charter of the International Trade Organization included a chapter on anticompetitive conduct.
See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf 2/78 (1948),
reprinted in U.N. Doc. ICITO/1I/4 (1948).
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addressed wholly within the conence matters that were traditionally
12
fines of the nation state.
For traditional trade scholars, the expansion of trade law into new
substantive areas holds great promise. New WTO disciplines can further restrict the ability of domestic governments to interfere with international markets, and hence appear to further advance the cause of
liberalized trade. But, in this area, things are not always as they appear. Pursuit of the "trade and" agenda poses significant risks to the
trade regime. I believe it is possible to identify at least two causes for
concern.
First, the GAT/WTO's expansion into new substantive areas
raises serious questions about institutional competence and expertise.
These arise because trade bodies-like firms, governments, law
schools and all other institutions-have certain areas of proficiency.
They are well-equipped to address certain issues, and ill-equipped to
address others. Indeed, there is little to suggest that the WTO possesses the requisite expertise to address sensibly many of the "trade
and" issues. Environmental advocates have repeatedly and persuasively detailed the GATT's shortcomings with respect to "trade and
environment" issues; 13 even a GATT report candidly conceded that
"[t]he GATT is not equipped to become involved in the tasks of reviewing national environmental priorities, setting environmental standards or developing global policies on the environment." 4 Similarly,
even traditional trade scholarship recognizes that "[t]rade bureaucrats are not the best officials to address the complexities of fair labor
standards or other social issues, nor are trade agreements necessarily
the best instruments for, addressing them."' 5 In short, if we applied
the theory of comparative advantage to institutions, we might conclude that trade bodies are not terribly well positioned, by virtue of
12 Michael Hart, Coercion or Cooperation Social Policy and Future Trade Negotiations, 20

CAN. - U.S. L. J. 351, 354 (1994).
13 See, eg., DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATrT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FuTuRE (1994) [hereinafter Esny, GREENING]; C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECrED ENviRONMENT:. BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994); Steve
Chamovitz, Environmental Harmonization and Trade Policy, in TRADE AND ENvmorME.

LAw, EcoNoMncs AND PoLIcY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993). I have addressed the institutional issues in Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1042 (1994) [hereinafter Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits]; Jeffrey
L. Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 607 (1994).

14 Report by Ambassador H. Ukawa, Chairman, Group on EnvironmentalMeasures and InternationalTrade, 49th Session of the Contracting Parties 3 (Jan. 25, 1994).
15 Hart, supra note 12, at 380.
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mission, experience or expertise,16to deal with at least some of the most
contentious "trade and" issues.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the expansion into new
substantive areas threatens to undermine international and domestic
political support for the trade regime. The argument here focuses
more on the political foundations of the GATT than its economic justifications. The GATT's drafters sought to create a multilateral, nondiscriminatory trade system. However, they were far from doctrinaire
free traders. 17 Rather, they recognized the widespread public rejection of 19th Century laissez-faire capitalism, and the corresponding
demand for state intervention in domestic economies to protect
against many of the harms and risks associated with a market economy. 18 Their difficult diplomatic task, then, was to design an international structure that "would safeguard and even aid the quest for
domestic stability without, at the same time, triggering the mutually
destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar
period."' 9
16 While it is often the "critics" that raise the "institutional competence" argument, this issue
should concern the "traditionalists" as well. The difficulties associated with "trade and" issues
are part of a larger problem the GATT/WTO system has in addressing challenges to trade measures imposed for political reasons outside the realm of trade policies, including GATT disputes
arising out of US-Nicaragua relations, the suspension of Poland's most favored nation status
following suppression of Solidarity, and embargoes imposed in the context of the Falklands/
Malvinas War.
17 As a former State Department trade policy analyst stated: "No one was committed to 'free
trade'; no one expected anything like it; the term does not appear in the GATr,which simply
calls for a process of liberalization with no stated objective." William Diebold, Jr., From the ]TO
to GATT-And Back?, in TEm BRETrON WooDs-GATr SYsTEM: REmROSPECr AN PROSPECr
AFTER Furry YEARS 152,158 (Orin Kirshner, ed. 1996). See also Jacob Viner, Conflicts of Prin-

ciple in Drafting a Trade Charter,25 FOR. AFF. 612, 613 (1947) ("There are few free traders in
the present-day world, no one pays any attention to their views, and no person in authority
anywhere advocated free trade.").
18 As the lead U.S. negotiator at the time stated: "There is no hope that a multilateral trading system can be maintained in the face of widespread and protracted unemployment. Where
the objectives of domestic stability and international freedom come into conflict, the former will
be given priority.... It would be futile to insist that stability must always give way to freedom.
The best that can be hoped for is a workable compromise." CLAIRE WILcox, A CHARTER FOR
WORLD TRADE 131 (1949).
While this political reality is often overlooked in current trade scholarship, it was forcefully
articulated in two of the leading contemporaneous accounts of the inter-war years. See E.H.
CARR, Tam TWENTY YEARs' CRIsEs, 1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939); KARL PoLANYI, THm GREAT TRANsFORMATION: Tam POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ORiGINs OF OUR TIME (1944). Dean Ruggie, in his 1994 Jean Monnet Lecture,

pointed out this similarity in what are otherwise two dramatically different accounts of that historical era. See Ruggie, Embedded LiberalismRevisited, supra note 8.
19 John Gerard Ruggie, InternationalRegimes, Transactions,and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INV'L ORG. 379, 393 (1982) [hereinafter, Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism].

PoliticalImplications of Trade Policy and Scholarship

17:759 (1996-97)

To achieve these varied ends, the GATT neg9tiators reached a
complex compromise: "the principles of multilateralism and tariff reductions were affirmed, but so were safeguards, exemptions, exceptions, and restrictions - all designed to protect the balance of
payments and a variety of domestic social policies."" ° Thus, the
GATT was structured in a way that both sought gains from trade, but
simultaneously "promised to minimize socially disruptive adjustment
costs as well as any national economic and political vulnerabilities that
might accrue from international functional differentiation."2 " Dean
Ruggie has called this compromise structure "embedded liberalism": a
form of economic liberalism embedded in a larger commitment to the
ability of domestic governments to mitigate the negative effects of liberalized trade. 2
Might the WTO's expansion into "trade and" areas threaten the
"embedded liberalism" compromise? I think that at least two related
elements of this compromise-one at the international level and one
at the domestic level-are at risk. First, at the interstate level, the
"embedded liberalism" compromise afforded each government wide
latitude over domestic policies, free of interference by other nations.
But, the emergence of the "trade and" issues reflects, in part, the blurring of the line between "domestic" and "international" economic policy; increasingly, the "international" includes any policy which has an
important impact on international transaction flows. 23 This explains
the pressures for WTO disciplines in new areas; however, any such
efforts in the areas of intellectual property, labor, environment and
competition unavoidably constrain the regulatory options available to
governments in what have previously been jealously guarded areas of
"domestic" social policy. In this way, the "trade and" agenda fundamentally challenges the policy tolerance central to the "embedded liberalism" compromise.
The international political frictions generated by "trade and" issues are well illustrated by the numerous diplomatic flare-ups prior to
the Singapore Ministerial Conference. 4 There can be little doubt
20 Id. at 396.
21 Id. at 399.
22 Id. at 393.
23 See, e.g., Renato Ruggiero, The Road Ahead: InternationalTrade Policy in the Era of the
WTO, Sylvia Ostry Lecture (May 28, 1996) <http://www.wto.org.> (speech by WTO DirectorGeneral discussing the "increasingly facile and irrelevant" distinctions between international and
domestic policy, and the political tensions generated by trade policy's expanded domain).
24 See, e.g., U.S. Tells WTO that Trade, Labor Issues Can Be Linked, Other CountriesDisagree, BNA INr'L TRADE DAILY, Apr. 16, 1996; ASEAN Unites in Objection to Proposed WTO
Social Initiatives, BNA INT'L TRADE DAmLY, Apr. 30, 1996 (Southeastern Asian nations take
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that, as negotiations move from relatively simple issues like tariffs to
relatively more difficult issues like regulatory norms, it becomes significantly harder to reach multilateral agreement. The continuing acrimony over trade and environment, and trade and labor issues, in
particular, well illustrates the very real 25
tensions and stresses that
"trade and" issues bring to trade regimes.
On the domestic level, the "embedded liberalism" model suggests
that the "extraordinary success of post-war international liberalization
'26
has hinged on a domestic social compact between state and society.
Under this arrangement, as we have seen, governments had wide latitude to intervene in domestic economies to mitigate the dislocations
caused by liberalized trade. But GATT's expansion into new areas of
domestic policy threatens governments' ability to deliver on their end
of this "social compact." The expanded trade regime restricts the regulatory and policy vehicles that governments can use in their efforts to
mitigate the dislocations caused by an increasingly globalized economy.27 To mention just one example: over time, the social compact in
poverty-stricken India has included the provision of inexpensive
pharmaceuticals. But, under the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement),28 the Indian government will be obliged to provide patent protection to pharmaceuticals, which threatens to significantly increase
the cost of medicines, and hence the government's ability to deal with
India's crushing poverty.2 9 As GATT disciplines continue to expand
unified stand against WTO discussions of "trade and investment," "trade and corruption," and
"trade and labor" issues.); US EncounteringStiff Oppositionto DiscussingTrade, Laborin WTO,
BNA INT'L TRADE DAi*y, Mar. 14, 1996.
25 See, e.g., United States Will Keep Up Pressure for Talks on Trade, Labor at WTO, USTR
Says, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 11, 1996 (pressures generated by mere attempt to raise the
issue of labor standards at WTO); Ruggiero Hoping to Avoid Controversy At WTO Meeting;
Sources Call That Unlikely, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Mar. 18, 1996.
Of course, the tensions raised by these issues would exist whether or not they are considered in the GATT/WTO context.. My point is more limited: bringing the tensions associated with
these issues into the trade system risks a spillover effect that can hamper progress on other
issues.
26 Ruggie, supra note 9, at 523.
27 There are, of course, numerous reasons why nations are failing to meet their end of the
social compact. Persistent budget deficits and tax-averse publics also make it difficult for governments to expand - or even maintain - the web of social policies that has characterized
welfare capitalism since World War II. Id. at 524.
28 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results Of The Uruguay Round Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 at Annex IC (1994).
29 See, e.g., Patents: The U.S. Turns on the Hea" India: U.S. Complains to World Trade Organization that Country Fails to Give Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
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into new substantive areas, governments may discover with increasing
frequency that they have inadvertently subverted their ability to manage the domestic consequences of liberalized trade in goods, services
and capital.
Moreover, these limits on domestic regulatory options in "trade
and" areas threatens to provoke a negative reaction from the public.
Public reactions to the GATT's "tuna-dolphin" panel reports3" and to
the labor issues raised by the NAFTA, indicate that public concern
over "trade and" issues will not be limited to a particular panel report
or recommendation but can turn into hostility toward trade regimes
more generally.31 Ross Perot's 1992 Presidential efforts-and, more
recently, Pat Buchanan's campaign rhetoric-illustrate how politicians
can exploit these concerns in ways that threaten to undermine multilateral trade initiatives. This is why the perception that trade bodies
have overstepped their appropriate limits can easily escalate into a

Chemicals,Bus. WoRLD, Aug. 28,1996. The Indian example has even led a prominent advocate
of liberalized trade to acknowledge that WTO expansion into "trade and" areas threatens to
overreach, and hence prompt a public backlash. See Overview of U.S. Policy Toward South Asia
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Near E. and S. Asian Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 67-73 (1995) (statement of Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Political
Science, Columbia University).
30 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GAIT Doc. No. DS29/R (June 1994),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
31 Significantly, this backlash cuts across the domestic political spectrum. For example, following a WTO Appellate Body decision upholding a finding that provisions of the U.S. Clean
Air Act were GATT-inconsistent, Senator Bob Dole declared: "We should decide what our
environmental laws should be. We should decide what kinds of regulations are necessary to
protect our environment. We should decide that our children deserve cleaner air and purer
water, not some bureaucrat in Geneva." Dole Callsfor Bill to Set Up WTO Review Commission,
BNA INT'L TRADE DArLY, May 3, 1996. The Senator reiterated his calls for passage of a WTO

review commission to prevent U.S. rights from being "trampled" in Geneva. The commission
would respond to concerns that the WTO might "begin to operate out of control" and exceed its
authority. ld.
Environmental activists sounded similar themes. "In its outcome, tone, and reasoning, the
ruling of the World Trade Organization's appellate body against U.S. clean air act rules provides
a real life example of the WTO's threat to environmental and health protections, democratic
policy making and national sovereignty .... Of course, it is the World Trade Organization, not
U.S. policy, which needs to be changed. The Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress must not cave-in to the World Trade Organization .... As a policy matter, the U.S. must
draw a line: international trade law cannot be made by secretive panels on an ad hoc basis."
Press Statement by Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, (April 29,
1996) <http.//iatp-info@igc.apc.org>.
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larger legitimacy critique 32 that undermines public support for trade
regimes.33

So, my first claim is that the trade regime risks being a victim of
its own success; that by expanding to new, more intrusive areas, trade
bodies risk (1) extending themselves into areas outside their substantive expertise, and (2) undermining the political support that makes
their existence possible in the first place.
II.

How C

riuTcAL is CR IcAL "TR.ADE AND"

SCHOLARSHIP?

As "trade and" issues have moved from the periphery to the
center of the political agenda, a "critical" body of "trade and" scholarship has emerged. Much of this scholarship purports to critique the
ways in which the trade regime has approached "trade and" issues.
This critique has prompted a spirited defense of the trade regime by
traditional scholars, who, in turn, criticize the arguments advanced by
the critics. "Trade and environment" is, perhaps, the most contentious
of the "trade and" issues, and thus provides an important illustration
of this dynamic.

Environmentalists have highlighted a number of concerns associated with liberalized trade. First, they argue that liberalized trade may
cause environmental harm by promoting economic growth that can
result in unsustainable consumption of natural resources and increased waste production2 4 Second, trade liberalization agreements
contain market access provisions that can be used to override environmental regulations.3 5 Third, nations with lax environmental regulations are said to enjoy a competitive advantage in a global
marketplace; this creates political pressure in nations with high environmental standards to reduce their level of environmental protec-

32 See Paul B. Stephan III, Accountability and InternationalLawmaking: Rules, Rents, and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997).
33 All of this suggests that expansion into "trade and" areas threatens to become the trade
world's version of "mission creep." This term is, of course, associated with the tremendous public backlash following the ambush in Somalia when 16 Marines were killed. Significantly, the
backlash was not limited to peacekeeping operations that substantially enlarge their original
mission, but at peacekeeping operations more generally. In the same way, public dissatisfaction
with the treatment of "trade and" issues by trade bodies threatens to become public dissatisfaction with trade bodies more generally.
34 EsTY, supra note 13, at 2.
35 Id. The tuna-dolphin dispute illustrates this point.
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tion.36 Finally, environmentalists seek the ability to use trade
measures as tools in global environmental protection efforts.

7

Many traditional trade scholars have strongly resisted arguments
raised in much of the new agenda scholarship, insisting that the critics'
positions threaten to undermine the liberalized trade regime.3 1 "Critical" scholarship has been attacked for urging a greater freedom for
national governments to regulate in trade restrictive ways. From this
perspective, the critics' arguments sharply challenge the trade regime's raison d'gtre, which is to discipline the ability of national governments to interfere with trade. A related objection is that the critics'
arguments for imposing duties on, or banning trade in, products
produced in environmentally harmful ways challenge the doctrine of
comparative advantage, the engine driving the international
marketplace.3 9

A shift in perspective, however, might suggest that the hostility of
traditional scholars to much of the "critical" scholarship should be
tempered. First, the fact that even the environmental and labor critics
of trade regimes define the problems as "trade and" topics already
presupposes a certain perspective on the issues. "Critical" scholarship
is largely devoted to discussions of how environment or labor issues
can be harmonized with the existing (or slightly modified) body of
36 Id at 3. Empirical support for the competitiveness claim appears to be scant. See; eg.,
Richard Stewart, Environmental Regulation and InternationalCompetitiveness, 102 YALE L. J2039 (1993). For an insightful approach to the competitiveness debate see Illeana M. Porras,
The Puzzling Relationship between Trade and Environment: NAFTA, Competitiveness, and the
Pursuit of EnvironmentalWelfare Objectives, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 65 (1995).
37 EsTy, supra note 13, at 2. For prominent examples, see Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 27 U.S.T. 1087, and the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, opened for signature Mar. 6, 1973,
993 U.N.T.S. 243.
38 "Many trade scholars-both lawyers and economists-view the increasing preoccupation
with 'fair trade' [associated with environmental and labor standards].as the most fundamental
challenge or threat to the liberal trading order that has arisen in recent decades." Robert Howse
and Michael J. Trebilcock, The FairTrade-FreeTrade Debate: Trade, Laborand the Environment,
16 INT'L. REv. OF L. & ECON. 61 (1996) (citations omitted). A representative sampling of traditional scholarship can be found in FAIR TRAIE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQuisrrEs FOR

FREE TRADE? (Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds., 1996). Similar sentiments are
voiced by the corporate community. At a recent American Society of International Law Conference, an IBM spokesperson declared: "Frankly, I don't view trade and environment as the biggest threat to trade. I view the whole panoply of trade and issues as the threat to trade."
Khristine Hall, Trade and the Environment"The Business Point of View, 1994 AM Soc. INT'L. L.
PRoc. 495.
39 See, eg., Piritta Sorsa, GATT and the Environment, 15 WORLD ECONOMY 123 (1992) (arguing that such trade measures would "work against the realization of comparative advantage
... undermine the rule based nature of the GATT and reduce the opportunities for gains from
specialization through trade").
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international trade law. Thus, discussions of coercive labor practices
or abysmal environmental laws are often transformed into discussions
of implicit subsidies or competitive advantage. n Similarly, "critical"
scholarship devotes substantial attention to perceived shortcomings in
the GATT/WTO dispute resolution procedures, and suggests a
number of reforms in these processes. But, by assuming the priority
of trade law-and by assuming that "trade and" issues will be resolved
pursuant to trade body procedures-the critics implicitly assure the
privileging of trade values over labor or environmental values.4 ' In
this sense, the "critical" scholarship lacks significant bite.
A similar conclusion results when we focus on the structure,
rather than the details, of the critics' argument. When critics argue
that disparate regulations distort trade flows, and that governments
should intervene to correct these distortions, they presuppose the
existence of "undistorted" or "normal" trade flows. 42 In other words,
they presuppose the priority and autonomy of international markets
in goods.4 3 In this way, critics from outside the trade community tend
to reinscribe the most fundamental assumptions of trade regimes.
So, my second claim is that "critical" "trade and" scholarship may
appear quite radical, but tends to be rather conservative. The key assumptions and the structure of the argument in much "critical" scholarship tends to reinforce key traditionalist assumptions about the
priority of the trade regime and the autonomy of international
markets.

40 For a recent example in the labor area see, e.g., Daniel S. Ehrenburg, The Labor LinkApplying the InternationalTrading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor,20
YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995) (asserting that forced and child labor violates customary international law and should be considered state subsidies under the WTO).
41 See Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits, supra note 13 (detailing how GATr subordinates environmental values to trade values). For a broader critique of the use of economic institutions and
economic rhetoric in a variety of contexts, see Jane B. Baron and Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against
Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARnozo L.
REv. 431 (1996).

42 Porras, supra note 36, at 79 n.20
43 For insightful critiques of the idea of autonomous international markets, see Joel R. Paul,
Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy,1 CoLItM. J. Eut. L. 29
(1995); Daniel Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of InternationalTrade, 100 HAsv. L.
REv.546 (1987).
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III.

INTERDISCIPLINARY "TRADE AND" SCHOLARSHIP:
"CONSERVATIVE" ARGUMENTS HAVE

Do

RADICAL IMPLICATIONS?

Finally, there is a third way we might understand the term "trade
and." "Trade and" could refer to scholarship identified less by subject
matter than by its use of interdisciplinary approaches. Here, the term
"trade and" suggests a loose analogy with the various "law and"
branches of domestic legal scholarship, such as law and economics,
law and literature, law and society, law and feminism, and the like. In
this sense, interdisciplinary "trade and" might be a shorthand for the
"new movements in international economic law" that Joel Paul surveyed at a previous Interest Group Conference."
Much of the interdisciplinary "trade and" scholarship is informed
by economic theory; and perhaps the most influential body of this subset of "trade and" scholarship is what I would call "trade and political
economy," or "trade and public choice." 45 It appears that much of
this literature is written by scholars who are strongly supportive of
liberalized trade, and that this scholarship has been well received by
traditional trade scholars. However, I want to suggest that trade and
public choice scholarship may present a more serious challenge to liberalized trade regimes than other "trade and" scholarship.
As I understand this theory, public choice applies insights from
the study of private economic behavior to politics. It assumes that
political actors advance their self-interests in ways similar to market
actors. It also views regulation-including national and multilateral
trade policies-as a commodity, subject to supply and demand like

44 Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J. OF INT'L
L. & POL 607 (1995). Among the most promising of these new movements is a trade and international relations movement. See, eg., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Public Choice and International
Relations Theory, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL 717 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and
InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization,44 DuKE L.J. 829

(1995). For more on the relationship between international relations and international law generally, see John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of InternationalRela-

tions Theory and InternationalLaw, 37 HARv. IN'r'L LJ. 139 (1996); ,Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.

205 (1993).
45 See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 32; Paul B. Stephan III, BarbariansInside the Gate: Public
Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL 745 (1995) and
sources cited supra note 4. See also Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International
Organization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 33 (Roland

Vaubel & Thomas D. ,Wdlett eds., 1991).
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other commodities. Governments supply regulatory results to the
highest bidders.46
Applying insights developed in collective action literature, public
choice theory explains why nations enact tariffs and other protectionist measures, even when such measures are sub-optimal, or reduce
overall welfare. The benefits of liberalized trade are widely diffused
among a large and unorganized group-consumers. However, each
consumer accrues only small benefits from liberalized trade in any
particular product, and thus has only a small stake in opposing any
particular protectionist policy. Moreover, consumer lobbying efforts
face huge organizational burdens and "free rider" problems. In contrast, the costs of liberalized trade tend to be concentrated on particular industries. These producers thus have .much to gain from
protectionist policies, and sufficient incentive to lobby for such policies. These firms will typically have lower mobilization and lobbying
costs, and a greater ability to avoid "free rider" problems than will
more widely dispersed consumers. For these reasons, well-organized
and well-financed interest groups, such as producers, will tend to have
greater political influence on trade policy than poorly organized or
financed groups, such as consumers.4 7 As a result, the political system

will be more responsive to producer interests than consumer interests
and will produce legislation and regulations that, although economically irrational from the standpoint of aggregate welfare, respond to
the rent-seeking pressures of producer interests.48
Thus, public choice theory has provided a powerful explanation
of suboptimal governmental regulations. But-though this implication has not always been recognized-public choice arguments also
suggest that deregulation-orgovernment inaction-can likewise re46 The literature on public choice is voluminous. See, eg., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBuC
(forthcoming); DANIEL A. FARnER

CHOICE AND PuBUc LAW. READINGS AND COMMENTARY

AND PILip B. FRicKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRMCAL INTRODUCTION (1991).

47 The public choice explanation of tariffs has been set forth on numerous occasions. See
e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Ronald Jones & Anne Kruger eds.,
1990); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991);
Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard". A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape

Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Cmi.L. REv. 255,275-76 (1991). An important historical antecedent of the public choice explanation is the pluralist account set out in E. E.
Schnattschneider's famous study of the Smoot-Hawley Act. EuMR E. ScHNATrscHNEIDER,
POLTICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935).

48 For these purposes, I am more interested in the political implications than the accuracy of
the public choice account. For an analysis skeptical of the accuracy of the public choice explanation for domestic and international trade politics, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global:
Toward the Transformation of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 19 HARv. EN-r'L L. REv. 241
(1995).
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fleet self-interested agendas and imperfections in the political process.
In other words, the decision not to enact legislation or regulations, or
to remove existing governmental programs, might be influenced by
the same rent-seeking forces that public choice scholars identify as the
engine of government action.4 9 Ongoing political battles over the
non-regulation of cigarettes may be a good current example.5 °
In other words, public choice theory can explain both regulation
and deregulation as well as governmental acts that restrict or that
open markets. This theory seems to highlight the primacy of politics-and the thoroughly constructed nature of markets, whether international or domestic. It suggests that, at both the domestic and
international levels, we might expect trade policies that maximize the
political welfare of certain narrow interests, rather than the economic
welfare of all interests.5 '
Public choice theory further suggests that when trade bodies discipline government action in certain areas, this result is not a return to
some natural state or neutrality. Deregulation is not simply a process
of getting out of the way that lets markets operate "on their own," but
is actually the shaping-or creation-of markets in the first place.
Under this understanding, we would not view markets as natural, but
rather as socially constructed institutions-just like the many other
institutions we understand to be the product of social choices.
But, of course, arguments like these are familiar. They are similar to the legal realist critique of the naturalness or primacy of the
market. The realists attacked the claim that the market was neutral
and natural, and the claim that law ought to merely passively reflect or
49 Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation:Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75
CoRNELL L. REV. 280 (1990).
50 For a history of these efforts see RicHARD KLUGER, Asu-s TO AsHms: AMEizCA'S HunDRED-YEAR CIGARETr WAR (1996). Other current examples abound. See, eg., Marian Burros, Congress Moving to Revamp on Food Safety Law, N.Y. TvMEs, July 3, 1995, at Al, 2; John

Cushman Jr., Lobbyists Helped Revise Laws on Water, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1995, at A16;
Timothy Egan, Industries Affected by EndangeredSpecies Act Help a Senator Rewrite its Provisions, N.Y. TmIEs, Apr. 13, 1995. For an interesting example of a domestic industry first vigorously pushing an international agreement that would limit government action, and then
reversing its position and helping to defeat implementation of the same agreement, see David E.
Sanger, Suddenly, as the Election Nears, Ship Subsidies Don't Seem So Bad, N.Y. TIms, Oct. 3,
1996 at Al.
51 Indeed, a public choice analysis of the WTO might suggest that this regime is itself a
reflection of rent-seeking private interests that have advocated trade policies that enrich a small
number of powerful interests at the expense of the broader public. See GATT Implementing
Legislation: Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerc4 Science and Transp. U.S. Senate, 103rd
Cong. 357-68 (1994) (prepared statement of Ralph Nader) (opposing Uruguay Round
Agreements).
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facilitate neutral market outcomes. 52 I want to suggest that, although
starting from quite different premises, public choice theory might
bring us to a similar position regarding the autonomy of the market.
The legal realist challenge to the primacy and autonomy of the
market, of course, suggested that "the market is defined by legal rules
chosen and enforced by governments, that other market structures are
possible; and that the kind of market we create should be a function of
considerations of policy and justice."53 In part, the realist attack laid
the groundwork for the era of government interventionism and activism known as the New Deal.
Public choice arguments have typically been used to show that
regulation can reflect special interest capture. They have thus been
powerful arguments for deregulation. Paradoxically, the arguments
also run in the other direction. In other words, public choice theory
can explain nonregulation or deregulation as a suboptimal outcome
that advances rent-seeking interests at the expense of the larger public
interest. It thus has the capability of providing a powerful argument
for increased government intervention. So, my third claim is that public choice analysis of trade regimes looks rather conservative, but actually contains the seed of a quite radical critique of the trade system.
CONCLUSION

In the last several years, "trade and" issues have moved from the
periphery to the center of the trade policy world. In turn, a diverse
body of "trade and" scholarship has addressed the difficult legal, institutional, policy and conceptual problems raised by these issues. In
this short article, I have attempted to identify a useful way of categorizing this body of scholarship, and to suggest some of its surprising
political implications.

52 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 at

197 (1992). See also Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force, 53 MOD. L.
REv. 421 (1990).
53 Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 535 (1988).

